Abstract
Issue of WMDs proliferation in general, and of nuclear proliferation in particular, has emerged as high priority agenda of post-cold war western community. However along with global non-proliferation efforts, a surge in nuclear energy has also been witnessed owing to mounting energy crisis and environmental hazardous of using conventional means of energy. Abundance of oil resources is considered a hallmark of Middle East region, nevertheless many states in this region has made commitment to venture into nuclear energy to contain depletion of their conventional energy resources. The region has a special focus due to its political instability and WMD proliferation credentials, particularly with regard to Iran’s nuclear program since last decade. Such troubled issue has made the demand of nuclear energy in Middle EAST a grave concern of nuclear proliferation. To address such issues of nuclear proliferation, Middle Eastern states have taken many voluntary nuclear safety and export control measures. One such decision is to voluntary forgo enrichment and uranium reprocessing capabilities by the state which intends to venture into nuclear energy, as is evident in case of UAE. However, the action of forgoing any nuclear related capability on part of an individual state is highly debatable as an appropriate way to address proliferation concerns. Many states have raised serious reservations on issue of withdrawing ay technical capability, otherwise allowed under NPT. There is a need to further strengthen and broaden the scope of IAEA safety measures and protocols including verification mechanism and implementing stringent export control laws to achieve the overall goal of nuclear non-proliferation, instead of denying or withdrawing any technical capability as a condition to enter into a nuclear deal for peaceful purpose.
Keyword(s)
Middle East, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, export controls, UAE, Nuclear Energy, IAEA