Abstract
Why Counterinsurgency Fails: The US in Iraq and Afghanistan is a memoir written by Dennis de Tray, a long time World Bank expert. The book describes his work in 2010 and 2011 as a member of an assessment team in Iraq and as an advisor to the 173rd Airborne Brigade combat team in Afghanistan. The book highlights the reasons of the failure of counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and proposes a solution for future US counterinsurgency campaigns by drawing lessons from Afghanistan. The author argues the benefit of routing economic assistance through the local government to build its capacity and increase its popular support. He states that the lessons learned in Iraq were then put in practice in Afghanistan by him and his colleagues. The book is divided into five chapters. In the first chapter, the author states that Counterinsurgency, also termed as COIN, was a strategy used by General Petraeus in the Iraq war. By applying the tenets of Counterinsurgency, Mc Chrystal was going to win Afghan’s hearts and minds to pacify the country. By the end of August 2009, he completed his strategy and devised a plan. The extracts of what the plan had to say are protect the people, win their confidence and build a government. This was the recipe to succeed. President Obama supported and backed General Mc Chrystal. In December 2009, Obama announced to send another 30,000 troops to Afghanistan to target the insurgency and to secure key population centres. Now the Afghan war was Obama’s war, whatever its eventual outcome.