Abstract
India and Pakistan have been attempting to settle disputes through pacifist means. Notable attempts include Liaquat-Nehru approach, Simla Agreement and Lahore Declaration. On the side surge in defense budget on both sides of the border designates that possibility of nuclear clash has not been averted yet. Kargil war was quite alarming but flimsy deterrence worked and South Asia had a narrow escape from nuclear brinkmanship. Terrorism plagued both countries as a consequence of war against terrorism. It also increased the risk of nuclear terrorism. Pakistan and India’s participation in Nuclear Security Summits fore shadows nuclear confidence building measures but both the countries are strong contenders for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) membership and India is seeking permanent membership to United Nations Security Council too. This paper theorizes that balance of power as well as the balance of terror between India and Pakistan are the agents of relative stability. Any asymmetry would likely to push both contenders to armed clash which may turn nuclear at any point. If deterrence sustains for a half century more, both may sign mutual agreements on reduction and limitation of strategic weapons. International regimes may also play a decisive role in furtherance of peace and stability in South Asia.