Abstract

India's conventional and nuclear arsenal calibrates the nuclear weapons capability of Pakistan. The Indian Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) program intensifies destabilizing arms race in South Asia. Its deployment certainly increases the reciprocal fear of surprise attack. The logical choice for Pakistan is to build nuclear weapons only that needed for deterrence, instead of entangling in the arms race. Simultaneously, it continues encouraging India to do the same. Hence, Pakistan continues its efforts for constituting Nuclear Restraint Regime in South Asia. Realistically, cataloguing the required strength of the forces to deter the adversary's aggression in the absence of arms control arrangement between the New Delhi and Islamabad is impossible. The continued modernization of both ballistic and cruise missiles is imperative for the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear deterrence that ensures the continuity of strategic stability in South Asia.

Keyword(s)

BMDMissilesMIRVsArms RaceStability